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Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence is a marvelous book. I agree with
most of it, but I will raise a few worries about some of its claims. In particular, I will take
issue with: (1) Pettigrew’s handling of Bronfman’s objection; (2) his rejection of dominance
reasoning when the dominant option fails to satisfy certain requirements of rationality, and
(3) his commitment to an accuracy-only epistemology on which, “the only constraints evi-
dence can place on credence functions come from considerations of accuracy, together with
decision-theoretic principles” (p. 29) I will argue that Pettigrew’s accuracy-only approach
should be replaced with what I call an accuracy-centered epistemology.
1. The Bronfman Objection (Chapter 5)
In 2003 Aaron Bronfman devised a clever objection to the accuracy dominance argument
for probabilism. This argument shows that each inaccuracy score I associates each inco-
herent credence function c with a non-empty set DI(c) of probability functions that domi-
nate it. As Bronfman observes, it is easy to ﬁnd pairs of scores for which DI(c) and
DI*(c) are disjoint. This seems worrying because, while I apparently encourages a shift
from c to some state in DI(c), I* seems to encourage a shift into DI*(c). But, if both
scores are legitimate, then no single coherent credal state is univocally recommended as
an improvement on c. Even worse, shifting form c into DI(c) can make credences less
accurate according to I*. In light of this, Bronfman argues that the dominance argument
depends on the false assumption that credences which are defective according to every
accuracy score are thereby defective, full stop. If the various scores do not speak with
one voice, why listen to any of them?
Pettigrew takes Bronfman’s objection seriously (pp. 75-76), and seeks to avoid it by
imposing a strong symmetry condition that eliminates every candidate accuracy score but
one (the Brier score). I once suggested something similar, noting that Bronfman’s prob-
lem evaporates if “only one [accuracy score] functions as the correct measure of epis-
temic disutility in any context” (2009, p. 290) I have misgivings about Pettigrew’s
symmetry requirement, though I will not discuss them here, and I no longer believe that
any single inaccuracy score will be optimal either across or within contexts of epistemic
evaluation. The class of legitimate scores is easily wide enough to sustain Bronfman’s
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objection. Yet, the objection no longer troubles me. I have come to appreciate that its
key premise is false: I and I* do not make incompatible recommendations when DI(c)
and DI*(c) are disjoint. The various inaccuracy scores do speak univocally, though they
don’t say quite as much as we might have thought.
Bronfman’s objection is based on the following premise:
Dominators. A person with dominated credences should always move to some dominat-
ing alternative, if she can.
This is false. Dominance principles are knockout rules that prohibit dominated alterna-
tives, but (absent further information) say nothing about which undominated alternatives
are optimal. An argument which shows that each option in set Y is dominated by some
option in set X gives us a decisive reason to avoid Ys, but no reason to embrace any X
(unless we independently know that the best option is either in X or Y). The same holds
for credal states. When I show you that your credences c are dominated by everything in
DI(c), I am not recommending that you adopt one of this set’s members as your credal
state. Rather, I am telling you to consult your total evidence to see which credences it
best supports, in DI(c) or not. Contra Dominators, it can be a mistake for someone with
dominated credences to adopt a dominating alternative, even when she can.
To illustrate, consider an argument from Easwaran and Fitelson (2012) which purports
to show that the requirement of accuracy non-dominance conﬂicts with the Principal
Principle. Ignoring complexities about undermining information,1 the Principle reads as
follows:
PP. If a believer with credences c sets c(Tp) > 0 where Tp says that the probability func-
tion p gives the actual current chances, then c should satisfy c(•|Tp) = p(•). So, if she
learns (or knows) that p is the actual chance function then she should align her credences
with p’s values.
Easwaran and Fitelson imagine a believer who knows that a particular coin toss is biased
0.7 for Heads, and who assigns incoherent credences of 0.7 to Heads and 0.2 to Tails.
They claim that invoking accuracy dominance to rule out these incoherent 〈0.7, 0.2〉 cre-
dal state violates PP because (with I = Brier) no probability function that dominates its
assigns Heads a value of 0.7. But, why is that relevant? Unless the incoherent believer is
required to adopt a credal state that dominates 〈0.7, 0.2〉 this is a non sequitur. But,
while accuracy dominance prohibits her from holding 〈0.7, 0.2〉, it does not follow that
she should hold some state in DI(〈0.7, 0.2〉). Instead, she should ﬁgure out which coher-
ent state, whether in DI(〈0.7, 0.2〉) or outside it, is best supported by her evidence and
adopt it.
What state might that be? On my view, any theory of evidence consistent with an
accuracy-based epistemology must satisfy:
1 Here each candidate chance is assumed to satisfy: p(Tp) = 1; p(E) = 1 whenever c(E) = 1; p encodes no
other “inadmissible” evidence in the sense of Lewis (1980). Pettigrew discussion of what happens when
these restrictions are lifted (Chapters 8-11) is splendidly illuminating.
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SUPPORT. If laws of rational estimation require a believer with total evidence E to have a
higher estimate for the inaccuracy of b than for the inaccuracy of b*, then b* is better
supported by E than b is.
The challenge lies in explaining when believers are rationally required to have a higher
estimate of inaccuracy for one credence function than another. Two principles seem non-
negotiable:
SUPPORTDOM. If b* accuracy dominates b, then b* is better supported than b by every con-
sistent body of evidence.
SUPPORTCH. If E contains enough information about objective chances to determine that
the objective expected inaccuracy of b* exceeds that of b (and if E contains no inadmissi-
ble data), then b* is better supported by E than b is.
The ﬁrst principle entails that if bE is nominated as the best supported credal state given
E, then bE must be a probability. So, we should hold coherent credences no matter what
our evidence. The second principle will help us ﬁx on the right coherent credences when
we know enough about chances to make inferences about objective expected accuracies.
Applying these principles to the Easwaran/Fitelson example, we should say that (i) all
the credences in DI(〈0.7, 0.2〉) are better supported than 〈0.7, 0.2〉 by the evidence ch
(Heads) = 0.7, but (ii) the credence function best supported by that evidence is 〈0.7,
0.3〉, just as PP says.
As this case illustrates, it is no problem when two inaccuracy scores I and I* generate
different dominance sets for some c since a believer who holds c is not required to adopt
a credal state in either set. Whether inaccuracy is measured by I or I*, she is advised to
hold the credences best supported by her evidence E, i.e., those that have the lowest esti-
mated inaccuracy in light of E. Since these credences might not be in either DI(c) or
DI*(c), Bronfman’s objection never gets off the ground.
There would be a residual worry if, for some E, the credences with the lowest esti-
mated I-value differed from those with the lowest estimated I*-value. But, this will never
occur as long as our theory of evidence is comprised of norms of probabilistic form.
Such norms will always require a believer with total evidence E to estimate credal accu-
racies using expectations calculated with a probability function pE.
2 Since inaccuracy
scores are strictly proper pE will always uniquely minimize pE-expected inaccuracy with
respect to both I and I*. So, the right way to “proportion one’s belief to the evidence”
will not depend on which score is used.
2. Does Dominance Need Strengthening? (Chapter 2)
This reading of dominance arguments raises questions about another aspect of Pettigrew’s
view. He claims that the mere fact that c is accuracy dominated is insufﬁcient, by itself,
to undermine its credentials as a rational credence function: b’s dominance of c only
counts against c when b meets some minimal conditions of rationality (speciﬁcally, being
both undominated and not overly “modest”).
2 This assumes that there will be a unique probability pE for every consistent body of evidence E, but noth-
ing important would change if norms of evidence recommended sets of probabilities.
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This is not how dominance principles are normally understood. Ordinarily, if A
dominates B, then B is deemed unchoiceworthy even when A is unchoiceworthy. As far
as I can see, the only reason to be tempted toward Pettigrew’s view is the mistaken idea
that, in addition to knocking out dominated alternatives, dominance arguments provide a
kind of endorsement for dominating alternatives. The suggestion would be that in invok-
ing A’s dominance to torpedo B we implicitly propose A as a serious contender for
choiceworthiness. If this were right, then we surely would want A to meet certain mini-
mum standards of rationality before using it in dominance arguments. However, when
we point out that A dominates B, we imply nothing about A’s choiceworthiness (unless
we already happen to know that either A or B is sure to be our best option). Perhaps
every option that dominates B is atrocious. It doesn’t matter! B fails to be choiceworthy
simply because it is dominated by something! This something itself need not itself be
choiceworthy.
This reﬂects the general situation. If we keep in mind that using A’s dominance of B
to eliminate B does not commit us to recommending A in any way (except to say that it
is better than B), then we will not be tempted to restrict dominance arguments by requir-
ing the dominant alternative to clear some bar or have some property that all serious con-
tenders for choiceworthiness must have. In particular, to prove that c is impermissible we
need only show that DI(c) is non-empty. This tells us that c is not the best justiﬁed state
given our evidence, and that’s all we need to knock it out of contention.3
3. Accuracy-Only Epistemology (Chapter 10)
Pettigrew might object to the forgoing because, by embracing SUPPORT, I am straying
from the accuracy-only path. My error, he contends, lies in thinking that norms of evi-
dence “have their source both in the value of respecting evidence and in the value of
accuracy,” (p. 29) while the correct approach would derive them from accuracy consider-
ations via decision-theory. The situation is a bit more nuanced than Pettigrew makes out.
While I do deny that evidential norms like PP, or any norm beyond Dominance, can be
derived solely from the requirement to have accurate beliefs, I also deny that “respecting
evidence” is a separate epistemic good that stands apart from accuracy. Let me start with
the derivation point.
Pettigrew aims to derive all legitimate norms of evidence from pure accuracy norms
by means of purely “decision-theoretic” principles that are free of all evidential entangle-
ments (to preserve the accuracy-only character of the derivations). Unfortunately, the
decision-theoretic principles that Pettigrew invokes are far from epistemically innocent.
His justiﬁcation of PP provides an example. Ignoring subtleties, Pettigrew seeks to derive
PP from the following allegedly decision-theoretic norm:
Chance Dominance (CD): It is impermissible for an rational agent with credences c to
choose o over o* when, for every probability function p with c(Tp) > 0, the p-expected
utility of o* exceeds that of o.
3 Pettigrew offers a version of the old “name your fortune” game to show that being dominated does not
prevent an option from being choiceworthy when every option is dominated. (p. 21) He assumes the case
cannot be a “rational dilemma” with no choiceworthy options. I have the opposite view: decisions in
which every option is dominated are rational dilemmas par excellence.
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In reality, CD is a conjunction of a decision-theoretic principle and a norm of evidence.
To see why we need some terminology. Credal states can be modeled either: precisely,
as single, sharp credence functions; imprecisely, as sets of such functions; or vaguely, as
“fuzzy” sets of such functions. On any of these models we can make sense of the idea
that a believer’s credal state is conﬁned to a family of probability functions C, i.e., her
credal state is either an element (precise), a subset (imprecise), or a fuzzy subset (vague)
of C. Lastly, say that p is a candidate chance for a believer just when her credal state is
conﬁned to the set Ch = {c: c(Tp) > 0}. In these terms, we can write CD as a conjunc-
tion of two independent requirements:
EU. A agent whose credal state is conﬁned to C should prefer o* to o when Expc(u(o)) >
Expc(u(o*)) for every c 2 C.
Chance Expert (CE). Assuming that chances are probabilities, a believer’s credal state
should be conﬁned to the convex closure of the set of her candidate chances. This is the
set Ch+ of functions c(•) = Σp kpp(•) where p ranges over Ch, and where, for each p, the
kp are non-negative real numbers summing to 1.
EU is a decision-theoretic norm if ever there was one. CE is plainly epistemic: it tells
believers how to proportion the strength of their beliefs to evidence about the objective
chances. It asks a believer with sharp credences to satisfy c(•) = Σp c(Tp)p(•) — equiva-
lently c(•|Tp) = p(•) for all p 2 Ch — so that her credences are her expectations of the
chances. (Those with imprecise/fuzzy beliefs will have credal states given by determi-
nate/fuzzy subsets Ch+.) Taken together EU and CE require an agent’s subjective expec-
tations to agree with her estimates of the objective chance expectations, so that Expc(•) =
Expc(Expch(•)). CD follows directly.
Unfortunately, this nice connection between objective and subjective expectations only
holds if we assume both EU and CE. Neither Chance Dominance nor the Principal Prin-
ciple can be derived from EU alone. To see why, go back and reread Pettigrew’s discus-
sion of CD on p. 752 of the Precis: “The Principal Principle. . . is a variant of a law of
rational choice that we might call Chance Dominance. . . So you should take it.” There is
a lacuna in this reasoning. The only “law of rational choice” in view is EU, which has
you buy the bet only if your subjective expectation of its payoff exceeds £1 (with utility
= money). But, how do we get from “the bet’s objective expected utility exceeds £1” to
“your subjective expected utility for it should exceed £1”? To bridge this objective-to-
subjective gap we need CE, which conﬁnes c to {p: p(heads) > 0.6}. If we did not
require this, then you would have no reason to assign an expected utility in [1.2, 2].
More generally, you have no reason to align your subjective expectations with the chance
expectations unless you have reason to align your credences with the chances. So, CD
presupposes CE. But, CE is merely PP generalized to cases where credences might not
be sharp! We have no accuracy-only justiﬁcation for the Principal Principle here.
The circular pattern recurs when options are credal states and (dis)utilities are I-values.
Here Chance Dominance is again a conjunction of a decision-theoretic norm and an evi-
dential one.
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Minimize Subjective Estimated Inaccuracy (EI). A believer’s whose credal state is con-
ﬁned to a set of probabilities C is committed to regarding b* as a better credal state to
occupy than b whenever Expc(I(b)) > Expc(I(b*)) for every c 2 C.
Chance Expert (CE). Assuming that chances are probabilities, an epistemically rational
believer’s credal state should be conﬁned to Ch+, the convex closure of the set of her
candidate chances.
As before, it takes both norms to justify PP. And, again as before, there is no signiﬁcant
difference between CE and PP. We have no non-circular, accuracy-only justiﬁcation for
the Principal Principle here.
Pettigrew brieﬂy considers the objection I am raising (pp. 129-132), but dismisses it
by arguing that
(i) CD is no worse off than accuracy non-dominance. Even though EI-plus-probabilism
entails accuracy non-dominance, using it to justify probabilism does not beg the question.
This is because accuracy non-dominance is more basic than probabilism.
(ii) Chance Dominance more basic than PP and CE because: (ii-a) it binds believers who
lack precise credence functions, and whether or not they are coherent; and (ii-b) while
PP and CE require credences to be conﬁned to Ch+, CD only has b* preferred to b “on
rare occasions” where all candidate chances assign b* a lower expected inaccuracy.
I am not persuaded. (i) ignores a key difference between the cases. The power of
dominance reasoning is that it does not depend on how credences are apportioned out
among events. When I know o* dominates o according to your desires, I do not need
to know anything about your beliefs to conclude that o is not your best choice. I don’t
even need to know whether you are coherent! Choosing dominated options is wrong
for incoherent agents for the same reason it’s wrong for coherent ones: it commits one
to incurring sure losses or passing up sure gains. Likewise, when b* accuracy domi-
nates b you are obliged to see b as suboptimal whatever your beliefs. So, accuracy
non-dominance follows from EI alone, without any help from probabilism, which is
why we can use the former to justify the latter. This is not true for EI and CE. So,
there is no parity here.
As to (ii-a), my formulation of CE renders its ﬁrst part moot. CE does not force believ-
ers to adopt precise credences unless they have precise beliefs about precise chances. It
does ask them to occupy credal states (precise, imprecise, fuzzy) conﬁned to Ch+, but CD
requires this too! If all candidate chances are probabilities it can be proven that, for any
inaccuracy score I, the only way to avoid being chance dominated is by having a credal
state wholly conﬁned to Ch+. (Theorem I.D.5, p. 92). This won’t be true if incoherent
chances are allowed, but in that case CD can sometimes recommend c* over c even when
c dominates c*, something an accuracy-based epistemology will never permit.
Pettigrew defends (ii-b) by saying that CD “merely says that, on the rare occasions on
which [the candidate chances] all agree in their ordering of two credence functions with
respect to accuracy. . . you should adopt that ordering yourself.” (132) This makes it seem
as if CD is a limited, local norm that applies much less frequently than CE and PP. In
fact, it applies just as widely. For non-trivial cases, there will be inﬁnitely many pairs
(b*, b) where b* chance-dominates b. CD requires that, in any such pair, a believer’s
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credal state must not contain a chance-dominated b. As already noted, the only way to
ensure this is by having a credal state conﬁned within Ch+, just as CE requires.
4. Accuracy-Centered Epistemology
The lesson here is that we should replace the dream of an accuracy-only epistemology
with that of an accuracy-centered epistemology that (a) concedes that evidential norms,
like PP, cannot be derived from accuracy considerations alone, and yet (b) does not
embrace “respecting evidence” as an independent goal that stands apart from that of hav-
ing accurate beliefs.
To see how this can be achieved, note ﬁrst that many evidential norms can be framed
as expert principles. Let Π be a probabilistic information source, i.e., a random variable
whose potential values are probability functions about which a believer might have or
gain evidence. Π might be the chances at t, a meteorologist’s forecast chance of rain,
my credences this afternoon, or even the actual truth-values. Let Πp mean that the
(rigidly designated) probability p gives Π’s actual values. A believer with credences c
defers to Π as an expert when c(Πp) > 0 and c(•|Πp) = c(•). It follows directly that her
estimates will be her expectations of the expert’s expectations. An expert principle
requires rational believers with credences c and evidence E to defer to some Π as an
expert, thus telling believers how to update their beliefs in light of evidence about an
expert’s values. PP is an expert principle with Π as the current chances.
We can relate the notion of an epistemic expert to considerations of accuracy using
two closely related concepts (where p ranges over all probabilities with c(Πp) > 0 and b
ranges over all credences).
• c sees Π as trustworthy when Expc(•|Πp)(I(b)) ≥ Expc(•|Πp)(I(p)), with equality iff p
= b.
• c sees Π as reliable when Expc(I(b)) ≥ Expc(I(Π)) = Σp c(Πp)Expc(•|Πp)(I(p)).
If a coherent believer treats Π as trustworthy, then learning Πp (and no more) leads
her to have a lower expectation for p’s inaccuracy than any other (rigidly speciﬁed) prob-
ability. By SUPPORT, she should then see p as the credence function that is best justiﬁed
by her posterior evidence (her prior evidence augmented with Πp). A coherent believer
treats Π as reliable when she assigns it a lower expected inaccuracy than any (rigidly
speciﬁed) b. A simple dominance argument shows that trustworthiness implies reliability.
For our purposes, the key point about experts is this:
FACT. c defers to Π as an expert iff c sees Π as trustworthy, and only if c sees Π as reli-
able.4
Committing to an expert norm thus requires us treat its expert as an especially accurate
source of information.
4 The converse of the last clause is true as long as c continues to regard Π as an expert after conditioning
on Πp for each candidate p,
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This might seem to offer hope for accuracy-only approaches since FACT seems to pro-
vide a kind of template for deriving evidential norms. If we can just prove that epistemic
rationality requires Π to be trustworthy, so that
(#) Expc(•|Πp)(I(b)) > Expc(•|Πp)(I(p)) for all p and b with p 6¼ b,
then we will have established Π as an expert for all rational believers. But, this is a false
hope. To prove (#) we must already know how to calculate expectations conditional on
Πp. But, since I is strictly proper, we know Expc(•|Πp)(I(b)) > Expc(•|Πp)(I(c(•|Πp))) for all
b 6¼ c(•|Πp). So, the only way to secure (#) is by having p(•) = c(•|Πp) when c(Πp) > 0,
which is just to say that Π must be an expert for c. Thus, we must assume that Π is an
expert to prove its trustworthiness, and cannot appeal to its trustworthiness to justify
giving it expert status.
The take-home point is that one cannot deduce a source’s trustworthiness from pure
accuracy considerations alone: one also needs to invoke norms of evidence. If we have
already identiﬁed certain sources as experts, then accuracy-centered epistemology can
help us ﬁnd others. For example, it follows from Greaves and Wallace (2006) that if Π is
trustworthy and 0 < c(E) < 1 then Π(•| E) is also trustworthy. The hard part lies in identi-
fying trustworthy sources to use as inputs in the ﬁrst place. Considerations of accuracy,
unsullied by evidential entanglements, will not do the job themselves. This is not to say
that norms of evidence are more basic than norms of accuracy. The two are sides of the
same coin. When we endorse an expert principle, like PP, we commit to viewing its
expert as an especially accurate information source, and thus to seeing the principle as
integral to the rational pursuit credal accuracy. Of course, to make these commitments
we must have good reasons for thinking that a policy of aligning our beliefs with the
expert’s values will promote accuracy. However, these reasons will not be found in an
epistemology that relies only on accuracy scores and decision-theory. Evidence must be a
part of the picture from the start.
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